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Abstract 
This article explores and analyzes the nexus between climate change, envi-
ronmental threats, and cyber-threats in a multi-regulatory contextual sus-
tainable global approach with Sweden as an example. Research and collection 
of material have been conducted with the precise aim to draw a parallel be-
tween environmental regulations and the cyberspace and cybersecurity sys-
tems. Many aspects of the cyber-security system are not known and are high-
ly fragmented. Selected points of the study of the Swedish cyber strategy are 
being developed in parallel to the environmental regime in order to better 
understand how to improve the effectiveness of the cyber complex regime 
from a contextual perspective. One way to better understand the cybersecuri-
ty system is to make an interdisciplinary study of how best to coordinate 
these systems, thus making both cyber law and policy more effective. This 
leads to bringing evidence on how to take inspiration from a regime system 
(environmental law or, more concretely, the environmental liability frame-
work) and using it as source of inspiration to understand and shape the for-
mation of another system in another area, namely cybersecurity. The method 
of this ongoing research consists of choosing and applying key aspects of en-
vironmental law (such as concepts and principles) and comparing them with 
comparable selected cybersecurity key aspects, which are selected because 
they present strong similarities with their “equivalent” focal points pertaining 
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to the environmental system. When conducting this comparison, multi-level 
governance is applied too, which means analysis of the sources of law and 
policy existing at Global/Regional/National (local) levels in order to under-
stand the interactions between different levels. The analytical task of the re-
search consists of choosing some focal points from the environmental liability 
system that are very similar and comparable to those of the cyber regime. 
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1. Introduction 
Global climate change and cyber threats are two major future global challenges 
in terms of regulation and management. Even though variables affecting climate 
change, cyberspace and cybersecurity are different, they present similar charac-
teristics from a regulatory and management perspective as they are associated 
with risks of anthropogenic nature affecting critical equities, including key sec-
tors of critical infrastructures, such as the energy sector. The potential for 
cross-pollination in order to improve the effectiveness and enforcement of the law 
can enhance the common regulatory protection system against cyber-threats to the 
energy sector, for example. This article draws a parallel between environmental 
and cyber regulatory problems on typical focal points pertaining to both regimes 
in the case of critical infrastructures in the energy sector in order to improve cyber 
law which looks extremely fragmented and uncertain in the way to regulate and 
manage risks (Radzwill, 2015; Hathaway et al., 2012; Schmitt, 2017; Tsagourias & 
Buchan 2016). The article advocates that law should look uniform and homogen-
ous and not based on a monistic vision, but rather on a multi-regulatory pluralistic 
vision where sources of law and policy interact in an integrative fashion. This ar-
ticle connects climate and environmental law concepts and principles with cyber-
security issues, and shows how these can be used in the cyber regulatory space in 
order to improve the management and effectiveness of cyber law. 
The aim of this study is to categorize instruments and mixes of instruments to 
design a sustainable, preventive and effective legal framework for protecting 
against cyber risks in order to enable decision makers to act preventively. The 
research question thus seeks to design a model consisting of a sustainable com-
bination of selected legal approaches and instruments to improve the effective-
ness of regulation and management to prevent cyber-threats and reinforce cy-
bersecurity. In order to do so, we first commence to individualize the global di-
mension of both regimes and examine key international legal frameworks, in-
cluding the possibility to apply environmental law principles to the cyber di-
mension. Thereafter, we analyze the regional dimension of EU cybersecurity law, 
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and lastly the national dimension, with Sweden as the primary object of investi-
gation. Three factors are taken into consideration: international cooperation, 
risk management (liability and insurance), and who is responsible (public go-
vernmental/private). Focal points common to the two regimes, such as the no-
tion of damage, liability, and insurance, are thus taken into consideration for 
cross-pollination analysis. Factors and focal points are considered in relation to 
stakeholders as well as the private and public sector. 
2. Global Level: Cyberspace through the Prism of  
Environmental Law and Policy 
In consideration of two of the world’s most overhanging threats: climate change 
and cyber-threats (Radzwill, 2015; “Cybersecurity Forum”, 2013-18)1 legal scho-
lars, policy-makers and the business sector are actively trying to understand how 
to manage and regulate the intractable aspects that characterize these two con-
temporary multilevel phenomena. The physical consequences and the estimated 
costs of non-action to these threats are enormous and still largely un-
der-quantified. There is an urgent need to tackle and mitigate risks in the cli-
mate change and cybersecurity (The 2013 European Union Strategy)2 regimes 
(Oran, 2012; Oberthür et al., 2012; Radzwill, 2015).3 Both regimes can be per-
ceived as “global collective problems” that share similar practices and concerns 
and interest the private sphere. The similarities of the regimes make it possible 
to analyze issues related to cyberspace through the prism of environmental law 
and policy. Both regimes deals with problems that affect the sustainability of the 
 
 
1The term “cyber-attack”, “cyber-threat” and “cyber risk” are different even though used in the same 
context. A “cyber-attack” is an offensive action, whereas a “cyber-threat” is the possibility that a par-
ticular attack may occur, and the cyber risk associated with the subject threat estimates the probabil-
ities of potential losses that may result. A cyber-attack is an act of unauthorized altering, deleting, 
disrupting, damaging or suppressing data within targeted computerized systems or network. See for 
that point, Radzwill, 2015 and “Cybersecurity Forum”, 2013-18.  
2The technical definition of cybersecurity refers to the Internet security as a branch of computer se-
curity specifically related to Internet. Its objective is to establish rules and measures to use against 
attacks over Internet. The advantages of cybersecurity will defend us from critical attacks and help 
us to browse the safe websites. Internet security processes all the incoming and outgoing data on our 
computer. The term “cybersecurity” commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used 
to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are asso-
ciated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cyberse-
curity strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the 
confidentiality of the information contained therein. See the 2013 European Union Strategy. 
3The term “cybersecurity regime” will be used in this article referring to the definition of Oran 
Young as a “complex regime” because cybersecurity is not yet a consolidated regime but it is in the 
process to become one and in that sense, this article helps to establish the existence of a regime when 
referring to cybersecurity. A “regime complex” is a collection of governance arrangements that are 
linked together in the sense that they address matters related to a common issue area or spatially de-
fined region but that are not hierarchically related in the sense that they all fit within some 
well-defined institutional architecture. The originators and theorists of this way of thinking about 
governance have focused on cases like the regime complex for plant genetic resource and the regime 
complex of climate change. Regime complexes vary dramatically along a spectrum ranging from se-
vere fragmentation to close-knit integration. For “regime complex” see Oran, 2012. Building and 
International Regime Complex for the Arctic: Current Status and Next Steps, The Polar Journal, No. 
2, pp. 391-407. 
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whole planet; the atmosphere for climate change, and world security for cyber-
space.4 Both regimes rely on doctrines of international (environmental) law and 
on the concept of sustainable development,5 which thus links the two regimes. 
Sustainable development is a central concept to equitable management and reg-
ulation of the global “common pool resources”, such as the environment and the 
cyberspace (Radzwill, 2015)6 which are both spaces not belonging to anybody 
but rather considered as res communes and res nullius. Cyberspace, Internet, 
and the environment, are all Common Heritage of Humankind (CHM)’s con-
cepts.7 
2.1. The Concept of Global Commons or “Imperfect Commons”? 
At an international level, the areas that do not fall within the jurisdiction of any 
one country are defined as “international or global commons”. The notion of 
global commons posits that there are limits to national sovereignty in certain 
parts of the world and that these areas should be open to use by the international 
community but closed to exclusive appropriation by treaty or customs. Examples 
are the High Seas, Antarctica, Outer Space & the Atmosphere but also cyber-
space (Redder & Hughes, 2008). Global commons are often governed by regula-
tions at multilevel, such as at the international, regional and national regulatory 
levels. There is no binding legal principle to govern global commons but the 
closest historically used is the common heritage concept (CHM). Since cyber-
space is the most recent addition in the sphere of global commons, it is worth 
considering how the CHM may be applied to enhance cybersecurity. 
There is not yet agreement on a common and established definition of CHM 
but according to Jennifer Frakes (Frakes, 2003) the CHM can be defined by five 
following elements: 1) there can be no private or public appropriation; no one 
legally owns common heritage spaces; 2) representative of all nations must work 
together to manage global commons pool resources; 3) nations must actively 
share the benefits acquired from the exploitation of resources from the common 
heritage region; 4) there can be no weaponry or military installations established 
in common heritage areas as, they should be used for peaceful purposes; and 5) 
the commons must be preserved for future generations. 
It is however as difficult to delimit cyberspace as it is to control the use of the 
atmosphere to prevent climate change. If not controlled, perpetrating cy-
ber-threats can destabilize cybersecurity or even the peace of the cyberspace. 
Here it is important to discuss the implication of how we perceive cyberspace: it 
is a “commons” or is it an ensemble of physical infrastructures composed by 
 
 
4The term cyberspace refers to the virtual realm (also called “Cyber-Realm”) created as a result of the 
use of information technology. Nowadays the term cyberspace is characterized as the “fifth domain 
of war” by some academics, states, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
5The concept of sustainable development will be treated in the next section. 
6The term cyber-space can be interchanged here with the term cyber-realm. They are both virtual 
realm created as a result of the use of information technology. See for that point, Radzwill, 2015. 
7The concept of CHM will be treated in the next section both in the environmental climate law and 
cybersecurity spheres. 
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cables, hardware, fiber optics, tubes or Internet. The fact that several Internet in-
frastructures are owned and operated by private firms and subject to multilevel 
governance presumes that cyberspace is an atypical or “imperfect commons” 
controlled by both public and private entities and subject to a mix of different 
private and/public tools and as well as policy strategies. 
2.2. Relevance of Critical Infrastructures between Environmental 
Threats and Cyber-Threats 
Critical infrastructures (CI) (European Commission COM, 2004; Tsagouring, & 
Buchan, 2015).8 and their protection against private individual or groups or for-
eign nations, are strictly intertwined with cybersecurity or the peace of the cy-
berspace (Fidler, 2015). CI are also strictly dependent on cyberspace as well as 
heavily digitalized, not least in the energy sector,9 which—although more ex-
posed to environmental climate conditions and environmental threats—is also 
subject to cyber-threats. In addition, cyber-threats and environmental threats 
interact in a way that increases the risks for CI. This is particularly true in the 
energy sector, especially in the European High North (EHN) areas, such as 
Norway, Sweden and Finland where there is a need to improve resilience (Pur-
siainen, 2018). Given the lack of treaties both at global and regional level regu-
lating cyber-threats and cyber-attacks, especially to CI and under environmental 
threats, it is up to the national level, and more specifically to the private sector to 
manage cyber-threats. Even if cybersecurity, or better “cyber insecurity”, is a 
global and regional problem, like climate change, initiatives for sustainability are 
still driven “bottom-up” and in the private sector. At the same time, the Paris 
Agreement (The Paris Agreement, 2016)10 signed under United Nations Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (The United Nations Convention on 
Climate Change, 1994),11 outlines, for the first time in the governance of the at-
mospheric pollution, an “integrated” top-down and bottom-up approach, as 
 
 
8Critical infrastructures linked to cybersecurity is relevant because cyber-attacks to critical infra-
structures permit to evaluate the risk-assessment of damaging capabilities of cyber-attacks. It is 
worth noticing that there is no precise and agreed definition on the term critical infrastructure. 
However, the precise definition of what this definition should include in the concept is not the same 
in all countries. The EU defines critical infrastructures as “…physical and information technology 
facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact 
on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of gov-
ernments”. See for that point, European Commission COM (2004) 702 of 20 October 2004. Also, the 
most common associated critical infrastructures are energy, finance, transport, communications, 
water supply, agriculture and food production, public health and security services (police and mili-
tary). See for that point, Tsagouring, & Buchan, 2015. 
9The energy sector is considered composed in this article by: oil, gas, electricity and nuclear. 
10The Paris Agreement, signed on the 22 April 2016, entered into force on the 12 December 2016 
and deals with greenhouse-gas-emissions, mitigation, adaptation and finance. 
11The UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty that became effective in 1994 with the ob-
jective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system. The framework sets no binding lim-
its on greenhouse gas emissions and contains no binding mechanisms. Instead, international treaties 
(called “protocol” or “agreements”) may be negotiated to specific further action towards the objec-
tive of the UNFCCC.  
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opposed to the clear top-down approach in its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol 
(The Kyoto Protocol, 2005).12 
2.3. The Tragedy of the Commons: Climate Change,  
Environmental Threats and Cyber-Threats 
In the same way as for cyberspace, the climatic atmosphere is not inexhaustible. 
The amount of clean air on earth is, for example, not without limit. The tragedy 
of the commons predicts a gradual overexploitation of common pool resources, 
including oceanic and atmospheric resources (Hardin, 1968). The question is if 
the tragedy of the commons is a possible scenario also in case of cyber-threats: 
can the Internet space be overused, as the pasture in Hardin’s example? (Hardin, 
1968).13 Both the atmosphere and cyberspace are affected by millions of actors 
and thus face similar problems in terms of potential overuse of resources. The 
presence of the “free-riders” (Nordhaus, 2015; Hansel, 2013)14 is also common in 
these contexts. No one knows how many cyber-attacks are needed to push the 
world into a collective dilemma, we only know that if cyberspace is treated as a 
“commons”—i.e. unregulated and unguarded—there is a risk that its resources 
will be overexploited and eventually exhausted. Common pool resources are of-
ten managed thought property regimes that can be difficult to enforce, and it can 
also be difficult to get rid of free-riders. To conclude, it is unknown how many of 
 
 
12The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty under the UNFCCC that commits parties to reduce 
GHG-emissions, based on the distribution of responsibility outlined in the Annexes established in 
the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan on 11 December 1997 and entered 
into force on 16 February 2005. 
13Hardin describes the tragedy of the commons in this way: “Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be 
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an 
arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and 
disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Final-
ly, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stabili-
ty becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates trage-
dy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or 
less consciously, he asks, “What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?” This 
utility has one negative and one positive component. 1) The positive component is a function of the 
increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional 
animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. 2) The negative component is a function of the additional 
overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all 
the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of 
−1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only 
sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another… 
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein 
is the tragedy.” Hardin, 1968. 
14Free-riders” refers to the “free-riding” phenomenon, which occurs when a party receives the bene-
fits of a public good without contributing to the costs. In the case of international climate change 
policy, countries have an incentive to rely on the emission reduction of others without taking pro-
portionate domestic abatements. The failure of the Kyoto Protocol, and the difficulty of establishing 
and effective follow-up regime, is largely due to the free-riders. See, Nordhaus, 2015. Similar, to the 
climate change regime, the free-riding problem also exists in cybersecurity governance. However, 
cybersecurity is not a pure public good. A state who invests in its cyber defense first improves the 
security of its own goods, public and private networking. Yet to a certain degree it also benefits other 
states’ cybersecurity. See Hansel, 2013. 
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climate change’s impacts and cyber-attacks it will take to reach a “tipping 
point”15 pushing the world, in both cases, into a collective dilemma, and what 
actions and responses in terms of governance could be applicable. The scale of 
the problem is thus similar for climate- and cyber-threats. In the long run, no 
one knows, for example, if the Internet can theoretically survive a nuclear war. 
2.4. Overuse of Resources 
Millions of actors can evidently affect the atmosphere and cyberspace, and thus 
the climate and cybersecurity. Cyberspace and the atmosphere share the poten-
tial problem of overuse of resources, difficulties of enforcement, and both spaces 
are subject to the inactions of free-riders. As previously noted, the nature of the 
problem in both contexts is intrinsically linked to the governance of commons, 
which exists both at the domestic and global, regulatory levels. Common pool 
resources are typically not inexhaustible. The areas where common pool re-
sources are located are often managed through property regimes that can be dif-
ficult to enforce and in some cases it can also be difficult to exclude actors, for 
instance if they belong to a “defined user pool”. Free-riders can thus exist also 
here. 
Examples of resources contained in common pool resources are fish, forests, 
lakes, and village pastures. Both cyberspace and the atmospheric climatic space 
thus share the difficulties to establish and enforce norms to control the actors’ 
behavior. In the case of environmental pollution it can be difficult to see to it 
that emissions limitations are in fact adhered to (monitoring), or on a less de-
veloped level even to control the use of the environment by requiring permit for 
environmentally hazardous activities. In the case of cyberspace, similar problems 
arise in the form of information and computer network and the use of the space 
on the Internet, as will be explained in the next section. This kind of uncertainty 
regarding what actions and responses, e.g. in terms of governance, that could be 
applicable, calls for effective intervention to promote the uses of both spaces in a 
more sustainable manner by promoting a “sustainable cyber security”, preferably 
based on the Precautionary principle.16 
2.5. Cooperation 
Cooperation on cybersecurity and environmental protection requires different 
forms of relationships, for example among governments and their law enforce-
ment agencies or stakeholders. These different forms of cooperation can be in 
the form of bilateral cooperation, such as Multilateral Legal Assistance Agree-
ments (MLTAs),17 informal bilateral cooperation, such as individual police con-
 
 
15The “tipping point” are composed by elements of the climate that may pass a critical threshold, or 
“tipping point,” after which a tiny change can completely alter the state of the system. Moving past 
tipping points may incite catastrophes ranging from widespread drought to overwhelming sea level 
rise. 
16The Precautionary principle will be treated in section 3.3.1. 
17Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLTAs) are agreements between two or more countries for the 
purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws. 
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tacts, or formal multilateral cooperation, such as the Council of Europe with the 
European Cyber Crime Convention (better known as the “Budapest Conven-
tion”) (The European Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, July 
2004). 
In the case of regional cooperation on cybersecurity for CI in the energy sec-
tor, the aim is to control and make secure any disclosure of vulnerabilities and 
incidents affecting the energy sector. This also includes cooperation among 
stakeholders. The difficulties lie in establishing an acceptable level of protection 
and cooperation. In both the cybersecurity—and the environmental protection 
regime, the duty to cooperate—as a general principle of international environ-
mental law—applies, especially when dealing with global commons. A practical 
example of such a (hard law) multilateral agreement is the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in which the duty to cooperate is 
stated in Art. 197.18 
In the case of cyber activities, nations must solve their disputes peacefully, 
without any resort to illegal force, and they have duties of due diligence to mon-
itor their networks in order to prevent them from being used to cause harm to 
other nations and in some cases to non-state actors and stakeholders (Jensen, 
2014). In addition to matters of peace and security, the duty to cooperate applies 
to the solving of international problems of economic, social, cultural and huma-
nitarian character, especially in respect to Antarctica, Outer space and the 
Seabed. An example of a hard law in the field of cybersecurity is the previously 
mentioned Budapest Convention that refers to cooperation in Art. 23.19 While 
the standard for the level of cooperation is not agreed in any of the regimes, 
there is consensus that states must exercise good faith when fulfilling the duty of 
cooperation, and that this is fully interconnected with a stakeholder approach, 
and relates to global commons subject to both public and private regulations. 
2.5.1. The Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol and the Montréal  
Protocol 
Climate change and cyber-security can both be addressed in a multi-regulatory 
governance system. It will however not be enough to solve problems related to 
effectiveness and enforcement; bottom-up action and the activities of civil socie-
ty at national level will still be crucial. Vertical implementation of international 
law via regional law (i.e. EU law) would improve and contribute to the commu-
nication of information and details regarding implementation of key policies 
and targets, both regarding climate change policies and cyber-policies. Also ho-
rizontal implementation of the regional law (i.e. EU law) at national level, e.g. by 
 
 
18Article 197 of the UNCLOS Convention states “States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as ap-
propriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formu-
lating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures… 
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic 
regional features.” 
19Art. 23 of the European Cybercrime Convention states, “The Parties shall cooperate with each oth-
er, and provide mutual assistance, particularly with respect to investigations of cyber incidents”. 
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providing information on activity plans and strategies to be implemented at na-
tional level in both realms, is important. The governance of cybersecurity and 
climate issues cannot rely on one level of regulation, or on one dimension (i.e. 
only vertical implementation) but rather requires a combination of the two di-
mensions (vertical and horizontal), with strong emphasis on the role of civil so-
ciety to ensure both top-down and bottom-up implementation. The role of civil 
society is, for example, highly relevant for the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement to minimize the free-rider problem and thus contribute to enhance 
international cooperation to combat climate change. Under the Paris Agree-
ment, even if individual countries’ plans are voluntary, the legal requirements 
that they publicly monitor, verify and report, as well as the practice to publicly 
put forth updated plans, are designed to create a “name-and-shame” system 
aiming to prevent international laggards of free-riders. This is in contrast to the 
previous treaty that the Paris Agreement replaces, the Kyoto Protocol. While the 
Kyoto Protocol was successful in terms of ratification and the setting of binding 
emission reduction targets, it did not enforce sustainable development, not least 
since only the developed countries were bound by the targets, despite the fact 
that large emissions also came from the developing countries. 
It took a long time for the Kyoto Protocol to come into force20 and thus have 
an impact on global climate policy. The “Montréal Protocol” (The Montréal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer to the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer of 1987),21 on the other hand, is consi-
dered as an example of a successful model of cooperation to address global 
problems, in this case the depletion of the ozone layer (Baush & Mehling, 2013). 
Although climate change can be considered a greater challenge than the deple-
tion of the ozone layer, not least because of the timescale of the problem, the im-
plementation of the Montréal Protocol can serve as a model for specialists, treaty 
drafters, and planners in the field of cybersecurity. 
When discussing models for cybersecurity governance it is important to be 
aware of the complexities related to the tipping point.22 It is thus highly relevant 
to understand how many and which kind of cyber-attacks it will take to reach a 
tipping point and put the world to take collective action. 
2.5.2. The Council of Europe, the Tallinn Manual and the Multilateral 
Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) 
Drawing a parallel between environmental regulations and the cyber space and 
cybersecurity systems can be an inspiring exercise for the governance of both re-
 
 
20The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol was delayed mainly due to the US withdrawal from the 
protocol that seriously jeopardized its entry into force. Although it was adopted already in 1997, it 
wasn’t until Russia signed it, in 2004, that it came into force. 
21Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montréal Protocol) of September 16 of 1987 
to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone layer is an international environmental 
agreement designated to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of numerous sub-
stances that are responsible for the ozone depletion. 
22The concept of tipping point is explained in Section 2.3. 
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gimes. Several aspects of the cybersecurity are however highly fragmented 
and/or unknown. One way to increase the understanding of both the cyberse-
curity system and the environmental law regime, and thus to contribute to their 
development and formation, is to highlight the parallels of the regimes and how 
one system can serve as a source of inspiration for the other, with the aim of in-
creasing the effectiveness of both. As noted earlier, an example of a cybersecurity 
treaty is the Budapest Convention under which the parties cooperate to combat 
cybercrime. Contrary to the climate agreements, the Budapest convention how-
ever allows for reservations, which permits states to opt out from specific provi-
sions, thus potentially weakening the regime (although aiming to expand partic-
ipation and speed entry into force). 
A comparison between the cybersecurity- and the climate regime reveals that 
a substantial amount of regulations, including the necessary multi-regulatory 
dimensions, applicable to global commons exists within the respective frame-
works. Nevertheless, the current governance is not sufficient to cover the gaps in 
cybersecurity. For example, in the case of a cyber-attack on a CI, there is total 
absence of binding international cyber law below the armed-attack threshold. 
The armed-attack threshold is the line at which the law of war is activated. The 
problem of the armed-attack threshold has not been solved by the Tallinn Ma-
nual 2.0 of 2017, an otherwise valuable tool to understand and assess the inter-
national law applicable to cyber-threats (Schmitt, 2017).23 Several bilateral and 
multilateral agreements are applicable in order to secure cyberspace. In addition 
to the Budapest Convention, there are dozens of MLTAs that can be applied to 
seek criminal prosecution of cyber-attacks and that specifically mention Internet 
Law (IT) and which are broad enough to cover all law enforcement investiga-
tions. What is missing in these cybersecurity agreements are the enforcement 
provisions, the verification mechanisms, the sharing information systems, and 
compliance dispute settlement’ mechanisms. Although the Paris Agreement does 
not contain enforcement mechanisms or dispute settlement mechanisms, the 
lack of right of reservation, the verification mechanisms and the bottom-up ap-
proach enclosed in the Agreement implies that it can still serve as a source of 
inspiration for the international law responses regarding cybersecurity. On the 
other hand, the information sharing mechanisms and the increasing number of 
ratifications typical of the cybersecurity treaties, such as in the case of the 
MLTAs and the Budapest Convention, could certainly inspire the climate regime 
and end up reinforcing cooperation and increasing the number of ratifying 
states, a number that in the case of the Budapest Convention has been consider-
ably increasing. The information sharing mechanisms and verification mechan-
isms are also crucial to avoid the problem of free-riders and to help prevent the 
 
 
23See Schmitt, 2017. This Tallinn Manual 2.0 is the new version prepared by the International Group 
of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence which is 
replacing the old version of this manual published in 2013 (Tallinn Manual 1.0). The Tallinn Manual 
2.0 on the International Law applicable to Cyber Operations had made a significant contribution to 
clarifying the possible application of international laws related to cyber uses of forces and armed 
conflicts involving cyber operations. 
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overuse of resources and the tragedy of the commons, thus enhancing interna-
tional cooperation and effectiveness. 
3. Confronting, Comparing and Coordinating Environmental 
Law and Policy to Cyberspace, Cybersecurity and  
Cyber-Threats 
Drawing a parallel between the environmental law regime and the cybersecurity 
regime is also fruitful to understand the gaps in the cybersecurity realm. As 
noted above, several aspects of the cybersecurity regime are still unknown and 
highly fragmented. This section therefore explores how the environmental law 
regime, and in particular the environmental liability framework, can be coordi-
nated with the cybersecurity regime. This is done by analyzing key aspects of en-
vironmental law, primarily concepts and principles, which are then compared to 
corresponding aspects of cybersecurity. For the comparison, a multilevel gover-
nance perspective is applied; sources of law and policy existing at global, region-
al and national levels are analyzed in order to understand the interactions be-
tween different levels on the focal points of each regime. 
3.1. Environmental Damage and Damage from Cyber-Threats 
One example of crucial focal points from the environmental liability regime is 
the problem of the identification of the author of the damage or the potential 
polluter. The identification of the author of the environmental damage (i.e. pol-
lution due to climate change) is often very difficult because it is difficult to iden-
tify the source of pollution. The same can be said for cyber-damages, as it is of-
ten impossible to identify the source and the author of the cyber-threat or cy-
ber-attack. Both regimes present anomalies compared to other regimes. In the 
environmental law context, these anomalies exist because ordinary rules targeted 
at the causality link do not achieve positive results, primarily because the logic 
behind the traditional vision of the causality link, i.e. the link between the author 
of the damage and the event that is necessary to attribute liability, is a mechani-
cal logic (Cassotta, 2012). 
In environmental law there is no such mechanical logic and it is often im-
possible to identify the author of the damage, for instance in the case of acid 
rains or remoteness of the damage or cumulative emissions. 
Also in the case of cyber-threats or cyber-attacks, the identification of the au-
thor of the damage and the source and origin of cyber-attacks is extremely com-
plex (Lalou et al., 2017). This is a fundamental problem in cybersecurity digital 
forensics. It is often extremely difficult to definitively name a perpetrator after a 
cyber attack (Newman, 2018). Hackers have a lot of technical tools to cover their 
tracks at their disposal and even if analysts figure out which computer a hacker 
used, it is still difficult to determine who used it. This is known as the “attribu-
tion problem” which makes it cumbersome to establish causation and liability as 
a consequence of the cyber damage. The problem of causation in environmental 
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and cyber damage can explain why it is difficult to apply the Polluter-Pays Prin-
ciple in these regimes; if there is no polluter, there is no one to be held liable. 
Moreover, what it the damage and how should it be quantified? How much 
should be paid for compensation and how should transboundary damages be 
dealt with? Etc. All these are anomalies pertain to both regimes. 
Analyses based on crucial focal points and solutions offered by the environ-
mental law regime are applicable to the cyber regime, here among environmen-
tal concepts and principles as well as aspects related to liability, insurance and 
environmental policy tools, as is explained in the following sub-sections (from 
3.2 to 3.3.4). 
3.2. Environmental Pollution and Cyber-Pollution 
The problem of overuse thus pertains both to the realm of environmental law, 
specifically to air and water pollution, and cyberspace. Both regimes are poten-
tial victims of the tragedy of the commons.24 In cyberspace, for example, “infor-
mation pollution” can occur as a result of a massive amount of spam messages 
that consume limited bandwidth. Likewise, the destruction of the atmosphere is 
the result of many individuals (companies, industries etc.) “maximizing their 
own utility” without regard for the consequences as these are carried by all. In 
cybersecurity, information pollution can be due to distributed denial of service 
attacks that can cause websites that have been targeted to literally crash, which 
can be caused by a massive amount of requests for website access (Bray, 2008; 
Ophardt, 2010). It can however also occur as the result of lack of defined own-
ership or regulation, causing individuals to overuse “their space”. Similarly, the 
atmosphere is highly subject to atmospheric pollution and does not have an un-
limited storage capacity, which in turn calls for governance, specifically for res-
ponses that limit the open access to nature overexploitation and mitigate human 
anthropogenic behavior. Such limits can be materialized e.g. through privatiza-
tion measures that aim for the establishment of well-defined property rights, or 
through the public sector, for instance through the implementation of policy in-
struments, such as the cap-and-trade system under the Kyoto Protocol, which 
also has the capacity to prevent free-riders, or through taxes or quotas. 
In the case of both environmental pollution and cyber-pollution, the major 
challenge is to identify the polluter (environment) and the perpetrator and the 
source (cyberspace). Against the proliferation of cyber-attacks, there are often 
no governance mechanisms and regulations in place, neither to punish or to 
prevent damage. Nor is there an effective governance response to the problem of 
greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change.25 Since both environmental 
pollution due to GHG emissions and cyber-pollution are by nature global phe-
 
 
24For an explanation of the connection between the “tragedy of the commons” and the two regimes 
(environmental and cybersecurity), see Sections 2.3-2.4. 
25Interesting to note, one country, Thailand, however has in place a mechanism to regulate informa-
tion pollution. The mechanism of regulation put into place by Thailand is the “National Broadcast-
ing and Telecommunication Commission” (“NBTC”) that has acted to reduce information pollution 
in Southeast Asia with regards to SMS spam and data roaming fees. 
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nomenon it can be adducted that even though many countries have in place reg-
ulatory frameworks that are “effective” or has the potential of being effective at 
least, it does not solve the problem. The way to govern cybersecurity and climate 
issues is to not only depend on one level of regulation, as previously mentioned 
in section 2.5.1. 
3.3. Environmental Concepts and Environmental Law Principles 
Applied to Cyberspace 
Environmental law principles and concepts can provide interesting insights to 
better understand and design cybersecurity regimes. One important concept in 
this regard is sustainable development. Together with the practices and doctrines 
forming international law, sustainable development represents important start-
ing points applicable to cyberspace. Principles of environmental law, such as the 
Polluter-Pays-Principle and the Precautionary principle, offer established plat-
forms from which cyber-security can be analyzed. Internet and cyber-security 
are very important tools for economic development with healthy and stable 
global systems. It is thus crucial that the goal also for cybersecurity is “sustaina-
bility” and stability, which in turn calls for a new type of important matrix with-
in the concept of sustainable development, one that links environmental and 
economic issues with cyber-security law. 
3.3.1. The Concept of Sustainable Development, the Polluter-Pays  
Principle and the Precautionary Principle 
The Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as “Development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their own needs” (Report “Our Common Future”, Brundtland, 
1987).26 Sustainable development as a concept in international law has evolved 
from the original into three pillars: economic and social development along with 
environmental protection. It has been acknowledged that practices and doctrines 
from international law on sustainable development are applicable to cyberspace 
(Shackelford, 2016). Cyber-security has to be sustainable to ensure economic 
and human development, as well as environmental protection. Therefore, there 
is an important interconnection within the concept of sustainable development 
that links environmental and economic issues with cybersecurity law. For exam-
ple, sustainability in the context of a legal framework for governing the exposure 
of critical infrastructures that are very much exposed to environmental condi-
tions to possible cyber-threats (i.e. energy sector, oil and gas, electricity or nuc-
lear), must account not only for present cyber-threats but for those of the fu-
ture. Concretely, in the case of a power outage caused by a cyber-attack, a 
newly built facility must withstand a flood of a higher severity that the historic 
highs suggest. 
 
 
26The concept of “sustainable development” can be traced back from a United Nations (UN) ad hoc 
Report “World Commission on Environment and Development” chaired by Gro Harlem Brundt-
land who in 1987 produced a report titled “Our Common Future” for the UN. 
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The Polluter-Pays Principle establishes the requirement that the costs of pol-
lution should be borne by the persons responsible for causing the pollution (Jan, 
2008). The Polluter-Pays Principle is closely related to the rules governing civil 
and state liability for environmental damage (De Sadeleer, 2006a, 2006b). The 
positive aspects in the linkage between civil liability and the Polluter-Pays Prin-
ciple have been highlighted by several authors whom have defined the Pollu-
ter-Pays Principle as a good instrument operating as an incentive to lower pollu-
tion in a way in which it is not the tax-payer whom has to pay but rather the 
polluter (Kramer, 2007). In that sense, it is important to ensure standards and 
environmental liability schemes in which it is the persons who are responsible 
for the pollution who shall bear the costs (OECD, 1974, 1977, 1989).27 The Pol-
luter-Pays Principle can be used for allocating damage due to a cyber-attack, in-
cluding environmental harm, as well as to offset the costs of dealing with “cy-
ber-pollution”—persistent activity aimed at overwhelming CI that is yet to ma-
nifest in a full-scale cyber-attack. However, the applicability of the Polluter-Pays 
Principle to cyber pollution should also take into account some challenges in the 
relationship between Polluter-Pays Principle and the sphere of civil liability, i.e.: 
who the polluter is, what the damage is, or how much compensation should be 
paid. Also in case of cyber (potential) damage, it would be difficult to determine 
the causality link where by the need to develop a robust insurance market or 
compensation funds willing to provide coverage for the diffuse and transboun-
dary character of these kinds of polluting activities. 
The precautionary principle aims to provide guidance e.g. in the development 
and application of international environmental law where there is scientific evi-
dence of uncertainty (De Sadeleer, 2007). This principle also reflects the eternal 
dilemma of how best to establish a balance between economic growth and pro-
tection of the environment (The World Charter for Nature adopted by the 
 
 
27The Polluter-Pays Principle is a norm of that transitioned from a non-legal recommendation to a 
central principle of environmental law (Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration)—and entails that the 
polluter should bear the costs of carrying out the pollution prevention and control measures decided 
by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. According to the orig-
inal recommendation, the Polluter-Pays principle should not be accompanied by subsidies that 
would create significant distortions in international trade and investments. In 1989, the OECD 
Council established the implications of the Polluter-Pays Principle also in the matter of accidental 
pollution and concluded that “the operator of a hazardous installation should bear the costs of rea-
sonable measures to prevent and control accidental pollution from that installation which are intro-
duced by public authorities (…) in order to protect human health or the environment. Three years 
later, the principle made its way into the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development where 
Principle 16 contains a formulation similar to the one established by the OECD: “National authori-
ties should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic 
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of 
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and in-
vestment”. See also several recommendations of the OEDC, specifically: OECD (1977), Recommen-
dation of the Council on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Envi-
ronmental policies, 26 May 1972-C (72) 128; OECD (1974); Recommendation of the Council on the 
Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, 14 November, 1974-C (74) 223; OECD (1989); and 
finally, Recommendation of the Council concerning the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to 
Accidental Pollution, 7 July 1989-C (89) 88/FINAL. 
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United Nations General Assembly of 1992).28 The precautionary principle can 
guide digitizing the existing CI and/or siting and permitting new CI facilities. 
For example, if the effects of cyber-attacks under environmental threatened cli-
matic conditions are unknown, the CI facility should not be built. In this in-
stance, applying the precautionary principle can serve as a safeguard against the 
risks of environmental damage and human security disruption. In the environ-
mental business sector, application of the precautionary principle can be difficult 
if costs are not “internationalized”. The concept of internationalization of exter-
nalities, e.g. pollution, implies that the potential polluter, i.e. the operator, 
should include, in the costs of production, also the costs for the environmental 
damage caused by the activity. This is similar to cyber business activities, which 
often do not take necessary measures against possible cyber-threats, and such 
externalities are not internationalized. This mirrors the difficulty in dealing with 
the private sector in matters of cybersecurity. They are often part of the problem 
because, when maximizing profits, the business sectors are not prepared to 
adopt the necessary precautionary measures, with the resulting risks of leaving 
entire sectors that are heavily digitalized, such as CI, without protection and thus 
exposed to attacks that can exploit vulnerabilities. The costs of the risks of cy-
ber-attacks should therefore be internationalized in the same way as the business 
sector exposed to environmental pollution is practicing. 
3.3.2. Best Available Practices, Best Available Technologies, ISO  
Certificates Applied to Critical Infrastructures 
The connection between sustainability and cybersecurity is the need for our civil 
societies to be based on social and economic progress and sustainable develop-
ment. In the management of cyber-threats, often not only the public sector, but 
also the private sector is involved in managing the interests of stakeholders. The 
private sector is often faced with managing cyber-threats as part of an effort to 
build “trust” with different groups of business activities, such as joint ventures, 
mixed agreement, hybrid business practices or corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and practices (Shackelford, 2016) Trust means a level of confidence that a 
computer system will behave as expected. The management of cyber-threats to 
CI or industry sectors highly digitalized can be based on instilling cy-
ber-security’s best available practices (BAP) and best available technologies 
(BAT) while expanding Internet access. Consensus standards are often necessary 
 
 
28The Precautionary principle entails that when an activity poses a risk, for example threatens to 
harm human health or the environment, precautionary measures must be taken. On an international 
level, it follows from the Rio Declaration that “(w)here there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation.” Thus scientific uncertainty is not a reason for postponing measures action 
to avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm to the environment. Key aspects are thus anticipa-
tion, a long-term perspective and a shift of the burden of proof to the actor. In tangible terms, for 
example in connection with specific activities, this entails an inclusive assessment of the activity, re-
sulting in concrete requirements for precautionary measures to prevent adverse social and environ-
mental impacts. The precautionary principle was first recognized in 1992, in the World Charter for 
Nature adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and subsequently incorporated into vari-
ous environmental related conventions. 
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to harmonize standards, and industry best practices provide flexible and 
cost-effective approaches to enhance cyber-security measures that assist owners 
and operators of CI in assessing and managing the risks. In cases where sustain-
able business practices are equipped to deal with issues of “trust,” cyber security 
and cyber peace can offer business models on which to grow business practices. 
This would require a new paradigm of “sustainable climate cyber security” 
that relies on the intention to protect business and industries that are highly di-
gitalized, such as in the case of CI, to literally be conceived and perceived 
through the prism of environmental law and sustainability when linked to cy-
bersecurity. 
Sustainability fails if the linkage between highly digitalized business sectors 
exposed to environmental conditions and potentially polluting are not governed 
through laws. Other tools drawn from sustainable development beyond inte-
grated reporting can also be applied to enhance cyber-security. For example, the 
private sector could also begin to develop the equivalent of Leadership in energy 
and Environmental Design (LEED standards), which would help identify firms 
with best options to achieve cyber-security. This is applied for example in green 
buildings where everything from building design and construction to mainten-
ance and neighborhood development is digitalized but must be provided with a 
“LEED-Type certification scheme”. This is a flexible and cost effective approach 
that enhances cybersecurity by assisting owners and operators controlling an ac-
tivity in assessing and managing the cyber risks and provides a map of cyberse-
curity best practices. 
3.3.3. Liability 
Civil liability is the liability or legal obligation that anyone has, to repair a wrong 
(or a tort) or a breach inflicted to another where for example subject x commit a 
damage to y and subject x is obliged to compensate according to law or regula-
tions which can be contained in civil codes or in jurisprudence. There are two 
main prerequisites for liability: 1) the existence of the causality link and 2) the 
existence of the subjective element of culpa. Therefore, the classical archetype 
that is found in all civil codes is: subject x causes damage to subject y, subject x 
must repair. However, problems arise when this archetype is applied to envi-
ronmental damage or environmental pollution because the goods belonging to 
subject y (which is the environment that has been damaged) do not belong to 
anyone, as it may not have owners (Cassotta, 2012). 
This is quite similar to the cyberspace, which is not owned by anyone, as the 
flow of information that constitutes its space is a virtual space. In the case of 
damage to the environment, or to natural resources (which includes the air), en-
terprises or the private sector of production-consumption activity, have to bear 
the costs. The enterprises have to internalize the external costs29 in such a way 
 
 
29The concept of internationalization of external costs relates to the activity of the potential polluter. 
The polluter is in this way (through the mechanism of the instrument of civil liability) forced to also 
include in its costs for production the costs that could emerge from environmental damage through 
a mechanism called “internationalization”. 
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that it is not society that bears the costs, but solely the polluter who is forced, 
through the mechanism of civil liability, to pay and it that sense apply the Pollu-
ter-pays principle concretely. This is a reasoning originating from economic 
theories advocating that efficiency in achieving the goal of environmental pro-
tection is achieved when all the external costs are taken into account (Oates, 
1992). Therefore, “internationalization” is a mechanism remedying the external-
ities that have to be understood as “external effects” of the produc-
tion-consumption activity of individuals (Oates, 1992). 
Sometimes regulations related to the so-called low probability-high risk in-
dustries, such as nuclear power plants are detailed and in other cases they are 
vague. Adding regulation would force the private sector operating under cy-
ber-security rules and exposed to the risk of cyber threat, to invest more re-
sources in protection or resilience of the systems they own or operate. This 
would not be welcomed by many operators, especially of CI, because markets are 
externalizing CI risks at present, whereas state regulation would mean establish-
ing “liability rules based on the notion that organization should internalize the 
costs of the risks they produce and that by internalizing them, they will make 
wise choices about the technologies they use” (Pursiainen, 2018). According to 
one author (Pursiainen, 2018), this would require a well-functioning tort liability 
legislation that would make it easy for the consumer, both public and private, to 
demand compensation for losses incurred by CI failures or enterprises heavily 
digitalized with vulnerable holes that could be exposed to cyber-threats. In the 
substance, lessons learned from the environmental liability system and applied 
to the cyber-security regime can force the industry to pay more attention to cy-
bersecurity, to invest more and to make the cybersecurity regime effective and to 
use liability as an instrument to apply sustainable development not only in the 
environmental area but also in the cybersecurity regime facilitating the shift to-
ward a sustainable cyber security. 
3.3.4. Insurance and Critical Infrastructures 
The main task of an insurance system in the context of environmental law man-
aging the environmental risk (Monti, 2001). The problem of how to best link 
insurance and civil liability in the environmental field, points to a constant and 
common concern at international, regional and domestic regulatory levels. The 
main problem in environmental insurance schemes is to make it fit into the me-
chanism of civil liability without the insurance coverage being transformed into 
a “legal certificate of pollution”, thus providing the insurance system with a se-
rious working instrument aimed at preventing environmental damage. In addi-
tion, the difficulties associated with “quantifying” the environmental damage 
may also turn out to be difficult for those who have draft insurance policies. The 
lack of information about losses and damages does not help with the problem of 
quantification. The same applies to cybersecurity, especially in relation to CI that 
seem to be particularly at risk of cyber-attacks and where calculating both the 
risk of an attack and the costs of cyber-attacks appears to be a very difficult task. 
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Businesses often suffer from a lack of information about losses and possible 
damages (Republican, 2011). The creation of an insurance system in the cyber-
security regime raises the dilemma of how to best handle the private sector’s role 
in cyberspace. In case of maximization of profit, some industries and business 
sectors do not take the necessary precautions, thereby leaving them open to at-
tacks that exploit old vulnerabilities. This is particularly evident when the costs 
of cyber-attacks are not internalized. Doubts can thus be raised about the free 
market’s ability to enhance cybersecurity and call for the necessary national reg-
ulation, even though it is not easy for a regulator to catch up with the rapidity of 
the changing cyber-threats matrix. A possible option for those governing the 
cybersecurity regime is therefore to create a risk insurance market. 
To sum up this section has explored the nexus between climate change, envi-
ronmental threats, and cyber-threats and the analysis has been conducted with 
the precise aim to draw a parallel between environmental regulations and the 
cyber space and cybersecurity systems. Many aspects of the cyber-security sys-
tem are not known and are highly fragmented. Selected focal points have been 
detected and the analysis has been developed in parallel to the environmental re-
gime in order to better understand how to improve the effectiveness of the cyber 
complex regime in a contextual perspective. This brings evidence on how to take 
inspiration from a regime system (environmental law or, more concretely, the 
environmental liability framework) and use it as source of inspiration to under-
stand and shape the formation of another system in another area, namely cyber-
security, as well as how to apply the analysis to other sources of law and policy in 
a multi-level perspective, as will be shown in the next sections. 
4. EU Level 
The EU level environmental law and policy is of course particularly inspiring for 
EU level cybersecurity and information system across the Union, especially in 
connection with CI, for example in terms of who is the author of the damage, or 
the perpetrator, and regarding which entity is responsible to take action, as well 
as in terms of risk and information sharing. This is visible when comparing se-
lected focal points of the two most significant and most recent pieces of second-
ary legislation, the Environmental Liability Directive on the Prevention and Re-
medying of Environmental Damage 2004/35/EC (Environmental Liability Direc-
tive 2004/35/EC with Regards the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental 
Damage as Adopted by the European Parliament and of the Council of 2004),30 
and the Directive 2016/1148 Concerning Measures for a High Common Level of 
Security of Network and Information Systems across the Union (Directive 
2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July concerning 
measures for a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information 
 
 
30Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35/EC with regards the Prevention and Remedying of En-
vironmental Damage as adopted by the European Parliament and of the Council on the 21 April 
2004, OJ, 2004, 143/56, the abbreviated version “ELD” will be used in this article. 
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System across the Union of 2016)31, both of which are treated in the following. 
When comparing the sources of law at EU level in two different areas (environ-
mental law and cyber law and cybersecurity) in order to grasp key aspects of 
both regimes, both the global and domestic dimensions are taken into consider-
ation, as this will increase the understanding of how to improve the cybersecuri-
ty regime using a multi-regulatory perspective. As mentioned in section 2.5.1, 
problems related to effectiveness and enforcement often require a bottom-up 
approach and action. Section 4 includes an assessment of vertical implementa-
tion of international law via regional law (EU law), but also a horizontal imple-
mentation of regional law at national levels (including national strategies and ac-
tivities plans involving the civil society). Understanding implementation re-
quires observation on how regional law (EU law, see Section 4) is implemented 
at domestic level. In Section 5, the transposition and implementation of regional 
law on national level, using the Swedish legal order as an example, is observed. 
This enables for the detection of any room for improvement at a national level, 
through a global-local approach, in turn inspiring not only the domestic levels 
but all the levels of regulation. This case study also ascertains if the detection and 
identification of the key focal points at global and regional levels analyzed in the 
previous sections are applicable in the domestic Swedish case. 
4.1. Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35/EC on the  
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage 
The overall objective of the Environmental Liability Directive (hereinafter “the 
ELD”) is to establish a common European framework on environmental liability 
for environmental damage, air, water, land and protected species and natural 
resources applicable to all member states. The ELD has threefold goals within 
this framework, which are: to harmonize environmental liability by establishing 
common criteria to which national legislators will have to conform, to ensure the 
applicability of the Polluter-Pays Principle, and to eliminate situations of inter-
nal market distortion and to secure trade. The ELD has an important ambition 
to promote and implement the concept of sustainable development, which has to 
be understood as a value and ensure its applicability by launching a new pattern 
of environmental protection, sustaining economic growth based on the necessity 
to follow a new model of qualitative rather than quantitative environmental 
production. Therefore, the ELD becomes an instrument in applying environ-
mentally sustainable development production by preventing environmental 
damage through the Polluter-Pays Principle. The Polluter-Pays Principle is con-
nected with the Precautionary principle especially in handling risks activities or 
pollution by forcing operators to take measures, as they will otherwise have to 
pay if the damage occurs. The ELD contains a very important innovation, which 
carries of a strong message: it is the operator which has in primis the obligation 
 
 
31Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July concerning measures for 
a High Common Level of Security of Network and Information System across the Union, OJ, 2016, 
194 R 000, the abbreviated version “NIS” will be used in this article. 
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to act, protect and maintain the environment and that a relationship must be es-
tablished between the operator and the Polluter-Pays Principle. 
The focus on the “potential responsible party”, who thus must pay for the 
pollution, reinforces the effectiveness of the regime and facilitates implementa-
tion. On the other hand, among the problematic aspects of the ELD are the iden-
tification of the author of the damage and the time factor, for example in case of 
cumulative effects or in the case of acid rain where the effects of pollution rever-
berates at long distance and it is difficult to identify how many polluters there 
are. In that case the ELD does not consider joint and several liabilities and past 
and present pollution, which open the path toward a new liability solution which 
also would include damage from diffuse pollution such as the GHG-emission 
causing climate change (Cassotta, 2012). 
Information sharing is contemplated in Art. 15 of the ELD: “where environ-
mental damage affects or is likely to affect several member states, those Member 
States shall cooperate, including through appropriate exchange of information 
with the view to ensuring that preventative actions, and were necessary remedial 
actions is taken in respect of any such environmental damage. Where environ-
mental damage has occurred, member states in whose territory the damage ori-
ginated shall provide sufficiently information to the potentially affected Member 
States”. 
4.2. Directive 2016/1148 Concerning Measures for a High  
Common Level of Security of Network and Information  
Systems across the Union 
With Directive 2016/1148 (hereinafter the NIS Directive), the EU establishes its 
normative system concerning measures for a high common level of security of 
network and information system across the Union. The Directive regulates the 
information system security for two types of entities, which are the “operators” 
of “essential services” (i.e. critical infrastructure operators) and digital services 
providers. The term is defined in the directive as an entity that provides a service 
that is essential for the maintenance of critical societal and/or economic activi-
ties, the provision of which depends on network and information systems, and 
where an incident would have significant disruptive effects on the provision of 
that service. The Directive states that the essential services operators should be 
regulated by national legislation taking into account country-specific and sec-
torial idiosyncrasies, whereas the digital service providers, which are more of 
cross-border character, are regulated in more harmonised manner by the Direc-
tive. However, also the essential services operators should respect the minimum 
requirements set by the EU legislation and when the services have a cross-border 
character, the regulation should be agreed with respective countries. The Direc-
tive obliges the Members States to identify both the “essential services operators” 
and the “digital service providers” to establish a national authority for informa-
tion (cyber) security, and it defines the cooperation bodies where the Member 
States harmonize their approaches with each other. The Directive contemplates 
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the need to raise the level of protection of the CI against cyber-threats, the global 
and transboundary nature of the cyber-threats to some CI that do not have only 
national character but rather global nature, (i.e. oil pipes, internet cables but also 
airlines, traffic control networks, or satellite constellations). This has been the 
object of discussion of the European Commission before and after the NIS Di-
rective and even before starting any joint initiatives in Cyber Defence involving 
European Defence Agency (EDA) and within the Permanent Structured Coop-
eration on Security and Defence (PESCO) context within the context of the NIS 
Directive. The NIS Directive recognizes the need of strong cooperation in order 
to align standard and most importantly to share information on systems, proto-
cols and technologies and recognizes the high degree of interdependencies and 
interconnection between CI, i.e. between energy, oil and gas, electricity, trans-
portation, nuclear etc. and this interconnection is not only across national bor-
ders but also transnational. The Directive also recognizes the need to tackle risks 
and vulnerabilities and the problem of identification of the perpetrator by en-
hancing resilience, information sharing and by recognizing the costs required to 
build security and resilience as part of the company’s governance. 
Enhancing cooperation and individualizing the entity responsible to act and 
take measures during cyber-threats is of importance, as stated in Art. 5.3 
“…where an entity provides a service as referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2 in 
two or more Member States, those Member States shall engage in consultation 
with each other…” and that, as stated in Art. 17.3, “…if a digital service provider 
has its main establishment or a representative in a Member State, but its network 
and information systems are located in one or more other Member States, the 
competent authority of the Member State of the main establishment or of the 
representative and competent authorities of those other Member States shall 
cooperate and assist each other as necessary”. Such assistance and cooperation 
may cover information exchanges between competent authorities concerned and 
requests to take the supervisory measures. 
5. Elements of Environmental Law and Policy Applied to  
Cyber-Threats in Sweden 
In June 2017, the Swedish government launched a national strategy for cyber 
security, in part to comply with the NIS Directive. There is no deadline for the 
implementation of the strategy; rather, the rapid developments in the area are 
expected to require flexibility for quick adaptation to international and EU poli-
cy and legal developments. In order to create the necessary long-term conditions 
for all stakeholders to effectively address cybersecurity, the strategy outlines six 
priority areas:  
 Securing a systematic and comprehensive approach in cyber security efforts, 
e.g. by developing a model for risk assessment; 
 Enhancing network, product and system security without compromising 
confidentiality, correctness and access; 
 Enhancing the capability to prevent, detect and manage cyber attacks and 
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other IT incidents; 
 Increasing the possibility of preventing and combating cybercrime; 
 Increasing knowledge and promoting expertise, e.g. through education and 
research; and 
 Enhancing international cooperation, for example by applying international 
law principle to the cyber security domain. 
In general, the knowledge gap—or potential for development—regarding in-
formation—and cyber security in Sweden is considered large. One objective is 
therefore to increase the knowledge about the most urgent vulnerabilities and 
needs for security measures both for society as a whole and for individual users 
of such technology. A systematic and coherent approach to information- and 
cyber security is expected to contribute to more uniform assessments of threats, 
risks and necessary security measures. With a coherent information system, dif-
ferent actors are expected to be more likely to reach the same security level. Most 
importantly, a national model is expected to raise the minimum level of security, 
first of all for authorities, but also for other actors in both the public and the 
private sector (Justitiedepartementet/Justice Department, 2017). 
The strategy stresses that the work on securing society’s cyber security needs 
long-term strategies based on core values such as the protection of privacy. 
Many interdisciplinary issues are considered relevant in this context; from ad-
vanced technical matters to organization culture and behavioral science. The 
strategy mentions, for example, the development of self-driving cars and intelli-
gent cities, which requires consideration of both sociotechnical, legal and ethical 
issues directly related to cyber security (Justitiedepartementet/Justice Department, 
2017). Also education and practice are considered important elements of the 
strategy as it increases knowledge as well as strengthens actors’ and activities’ re-
silience to IT-related incidents: “Regular exercises both nationally and interna-
tionally are a prerequisite for developing and evaluating structures for managing 
serious IT incidents and for identifying organizational, technical and adminis-
trative development needs.” (Justitiedepartementet/Justice Department, 2017).32 
It is pointed out that, while there is international consensus within the UN 
regarding the applicability of international law in the cyber area, considerable 
difficulties and challenges related to the interpretation and hence the implemen-
tation of the rules remain. Sweden opposes a state-controlled Internet, but sup-
ports the possibilities to apply international legal frameworks to verify, point out 
and demand responsibility. The need for Sweden to take an active role in this 
development is stressed (Justitiedepartementet/Justice Department, 2017), In re-
lation to international trade and economic cooperation, the position of the Swe-
dish government is that “cybersecurity must be guaranteed within the frame-
work of the overall ambition to promote innovations, competitiveness and so-
cietal development.” It is furthermore considered important to uphold free data 
 
 
32Justitiedepartementet/Justice Department (2017), Skr. 2016/17:213. Nationell strategi för 
samhällets informations och cybersäkerhet/National Strategy for Society’s Information- and Cyber-
security. P. 29. 
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flows and counteract digital protectionism, e.g. in the form of localization re-
quirement that imply that data must be stored in the home country. In all, it is 
strongly emphasized that the strive towards cybersecurity must not interfere 
with, or hamper, trade relations, neither within the EU nor outside. 
In 2018, Act on information security for important and digital services en-
tered into force. The purpose of the act is, in keeping with the NIS Directive33, to 
achieve a high level of security for networks and information systems for socially 
important sectors, including energy, transport, banking, financial market infra-
structure, digital infrastructure, and digital services (Act, 2018:1174).34 To ensure 
a level of security that is appropriate in relation to the risk, as well as the conti-
nuity of the services, suppliers of such vital public services shall: a) conduct sys-
tematic and risk-based information security work on networks and information 
systems; and b) take appropriate and proportionate technical and organizational 
measures to manage risks that threaten the security of networks and information 
systems, as well as prevent and minimize the effects of incidents that affect net-
works and information systems. Basically the same requirements and for the 
same reasons are imposed on suppliers of digital services: they shall take the 
technical and organizational measures they consider effective and proportionate 
to manage risks that threaten the security of networks and information systems 
used when providing digital services (Act, 2018:1174).35 
The Swedish strategy thus focuses primarily on two aspects: first and fore-
most, the safeguarding of basic values, such as democracy, legal certainty and 
human rights, and secondly to implement EU legislation. Some elements of en-
vironmental law and policy can be traced here, for example that all measures 
must be proportionate and effective, and the emphasis on the need to balance 
different interests, such as the protection against cyber threats versus property 
rights, in the risk assessment. 
6. Conclusion 
By comparing the environmental regulation system with the cyber security sys-
tem, interesting conclusions can be drawn; the (quite significant) parallels be-
tween the two systems allow for increased understanding of how to integrate 
some key aspects. 
This article has demonstrated that one way to better understand the complex-
ity of the cybersecurity system, not least in terms of the regulatory challenges 
facing most countries, is to try to find solutions within existing similar systems. 
In this article we have conducted a cross-area and interdisciplinary study in-
volving both the cybersecurity system and the environmental regulation system. 
The study aims to examine how to best coordinate these systems, thus making 
them more effective. To this end, we have collected evidence on how characte-
 
 
33Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning 
measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. 
34Act (2018:1174) on information security for important and digital services, s. 1. 
35Act (2018:1174) on information security for important and digital services, s. 11-16. 
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ristics from one regime system, the environmental regulation system—or more 
specifically, the environmental liability framework, can be used as source of in-
spiration to understand and shape the formation of another system, namely cy-
bersecurity. This research thus puts forward a new approach for addressing reg-
ulatory challenges. In light of a basic assumption that there are great similarities 
between different regulatory regimes at system level, key aspects of one system 
are analyzed and compared to corresponding aspects of another system, with the 
aim of improving both systems. In this article, the environmental regulation 
system, primarily concepts and principles, is selected as the starting point for the 
comparison. It seems particularly appropriate to try to profit from the sustaina-
bility perspective that permeates this regime when designing overarching solu-
tions to increase cybersecurity. As the more recently developed regime, the cy-
bersecurity system is thus the main recipient of the analysis, although the aim of 
the research is of course cross-fertilization. 
When conducting the comparison, multi-level governance concepts have been 
applied. This entails analysis of the sources of law and policy existing at interna-
tional, regional and national levels in order to understand the interactions be-
tween these interdependent levels. For example, challenges at national level, as in 
the case of Sweden, can be tackled in a “global-local approach” so as to improve 
national law in terms of effectiveness of regulation. While the Swedish model is 
in agreement with some focal points compared to the EU and international level, 
there is naturally room for improvement in a system this new. With the know-
ledge produced in this research, we hope to inspire legislators at all levels. The 
comparison could lead to a compact, unified approach. The challenges facing the 
cybersecurity domain cannot be met by domestic law and policy alone. 
Some elements of the examined systems are “constant” at all levels in the pa-
rallel between cybersecurity and environmental regulation, including climate 
space: a) the need for a multilayer approach; the necessity of designing the sys-
tem upon principles (e.g. of international and environmental law); the impor-
tance of international cooperation, not least regarding information sharing; in-
teraction between public/private sectors; and the diffusion of technical know-
ledge, i.e., the attentive consultation of risk assessment. 
Given the multiple deficiencies that exist in the examined regimes, poli-
cy-makers, managers and treaty makers operating in the area of cybersecurity 
need to be better informed about the transition from cybersecurity towards 
“sustainable cybersecurity behavior” that is currently taking place. This article 
has suggested new perspectives on how the effectiveness of the cybersecurity re-
gime can be improved, with practical examples on how to overcome gaps and 
deficiencies in a way that would reinforce the regime, amongst other: the crea-
tion of a risk insurance market; ways to avoid the problems of free-riders; and 
how to mitigate the tragedy of commons. The suggestions are based on inspira-
tion from the examined regimes, both in terms of treaty making, private practic-
es and the ways in which different interests are balanced in the risk assessment, 
for example regarding the protection against cyber threats through international 
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(environmental) law principles and tools versus property rights and other pri-
vate interests. 
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